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THE CULTURE WARS AND AMERICAN JEWS
Are Jews combatants in the American culture wars? Yes, but in a highly idiosyncratic 
way. To understand their role we must first delineate the battle lines of the struggle.
The term “culture wars” entered the American lexicon in 1992 with the pu-
blication of James Davison Hunter’s book by that name,1 although the phenomenon 
he described began in earnest in the late 1970s and its roots go back at least a de-
cade earlier. Hunter argued that instead of contesting with each other on historical 
or theological grounds – as had been the case in the past – Catholic, Protestant and 
Jewish America were now each internally divided about whether, and to what extent, 
traditional moral values should guide public life. Hunter cited evidence that on this 
question followers of these religions were increasingly finding that they had more in 
common with likeminded members of other faiths than with people in their religious 
community who took the opposite position on the appropriate role of moral values 
in the civic arena.
On the one side are liberals, adherents of all three religions who tend to view 
moral choices as private matters and seek to maximize individual freedom by allo-
wing people to decide them for themselves. At the level of public policy, they feel 
that traditional norms inherited from the past should yield to secular considerations 
of the present. In their view, allowing religiously-mandated doctrine to affect public 
policy could trample the rights of those belonging to minority faiths or to no faith. 
To be sure, proponents of this position are not necessarily consistent, as they often 
1 J. Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America, New York 1992.
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welcome faith-based support for liberal views they espouse, such as the religious 
argument for racial equality. 
On the other side are those from the traditionalist wings of these same reli-
gions who bemoan what the late Father Richard John Neuhaus called “The Naked 
Public Square.”2 They argue that a secularized society that prioritizes individual au-
tonomy and rules out traditionalist religious voices invites moral relativism and may 
even threaten the individual rights of those guided by traditional values, as  they 
claim is happening in the current push to require Catholic-sponsored hospitals to 
provide abortions. 
The Nature of the Conflict
While the culture wars play out on a host of specific issues, these can be subsumed 
under three broad categories.
One has to do with religion in public venues. The most important of these are 
the public schools. In fact the first shots in what would become a full-fledged culture 
war may very well have been fired in 1962, when the U.S. Supreme Court, in Engel 
v. Vitale, invalidated prayer – even of the nondenominational variety – in public scho-
ols. Ever since, there has been ongoing dispute and intermittent litigation over the 
teaching of religion and the celebration of religious holidays in the classroom, and 
the use of tax money to provide benefits for nonpublic religiously-sponsored schools. 
Another hot-button issue is curricular. Should science classes that teach the theory of 
evolution also present the alternative creationist view, backed by some traditionalists, 
that explains the world as the product of a Creator? Should history and civics classes 
stress the unique greatness of the American way of life, in line with the way traditio-
nalists tend to look at their country’s history, or point out its mistreatment of women, 
blacks and other minorities? Does classroom subjection to theories that undermine 
his or her family’s deeply-held beliefs violate a child’s rights? 
Another public-space issue is the placement of religious symbols in parks and 
government buildings, or on streets. Here as well, the courts have generally decided 
against those eager to recognize God in the public square, and this, in turn, has indu-
ced proponents of such displays to fall back on the argument that Christmas trees (as 
opposed to mangers), Easter bunnies and Hanukkah menorahs are actually secular in 
nature, and therefore permitted in public places.
A second area of contention is the potential conflict between individual choice 
and the religion-based idea of sanctity of life.  The hot-button issue is abortion. For 
most liberals, termination of pregnancy is a decision best left to the option of the pre-
gnant woman. However the official Catholic position equates abortion – irrespective 
of the reason – with murder, and a great many traditionalist Protestants and Orthodox 
2 R. J. Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America, Grand 
Rapids MI 1984.
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Jews would allow it under only highly restricted circumstances. This conflict also 
reflects differing views of the rights of women. Proponents of the right to abortion see 
it as a feminist cause and criticize opponents as hostile to the interests of women. As 
in the case of public-school prayer, the Supreme Court has intervened on the liberal 
side, but efforts to restrict abortion rights and ultimately end them continue. 
Another “life” issue is the conflict over “pulling the plug,” terminating the 
treatment of critically ill patients where there is no chance for recovery. Here too, the 
autonomous choice of the family to end treatment comes up against the traditional 
taboo, codified by the monotheistic religions, against ending life.
The third cluster of issues concern sexuality, again pitting individual self-ful-
fillment against traditional group norms. Some duel over the availability of porno-
graphy on the street corner or the internet, and others over whether the government 
should be funding birth control – here, too, pitting pro-feminist liberals against tradi-
tionalists – but the truly explosive debate today concerns homosexuality. The mono-
theistic religions have traditionally condemned same-sex relations, and so self-evi-
dent did the ban appear that American state laws enforced it. But over the last few 
decades those upholding the heterosexual standard have been put on the defensive: 
homosexual activity was first decriminalized and then given social cachet, and now 
several states have legalized gay marriage on the grounds that people ought to be 
allowed to marry whom they please, irrespective of older, religion-based norms. 
It is surely noteworthy that every one of these battles in the culture wars arrays 
proponents of individual choice against norms associated with the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, a tradition originating in the Old Testament, the Hebrew Bible. The as-
sumption that religious values must underpin all aspects of life; the conviction that 
God purposefully created the world; the notion that all life is sacred since God is 
its source; and the privileging of heterosexual marriage as the norm for society all 
originated as Jewish ideas, and were carried on by Christianity. Yet paradoxically, 
contemporary American Jewish opinion, unlike the situation among Christians, veers 
overwhelmingly to the liberal side of the culture wars.
Where the Jews Are
Studies conducted over the years comparing the views of Jewish and non-Jewish 
Americans have repeatedly confirmed the Jews’ anomalous position in the culture 
wars. 
The 1981 National Survey of American Jews, conducted by Steven M. Cohen, 
found that 72% of American Jews favored enactment of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, which would have enshrined equality of men and women in the Constitution. 
In contrast, two national polls on this question yielded 45% and 52% in favor. Asked 
whether homosexuals ought to be allowed to teach in the public schools, 67% of the 
Jewish sample answered in the affirmative as compared to just 45% in a national Gal-
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lup poll. Half of the Jews polled agreed to government funding for abortions, a po-
sition that only 40% took in two national surveys. Not surprisingly, 65% of the Jews 
said they were Democrats, the more liberal party, generally unfriendly to allowing 
religion a role in public decision-making. In contrast, 45% of the general American 
public identified as Democrats.3
Things were no different two decades later. A survey sponsored by the Center 
for Jewish Community Studies in 2000, also conducted by Steven M. Cohen, asked 
a national sample of Jews an even more extensive battery of questions and compared 
the results to national polls. While 65% of the general public would allow display of 
the Ten Commandments in public schools, only 38% of the Jews agreed, and even 
allowing a moment of silence each day for students wishing to pray, approved by 84 
percent of the public, received support from just 48% of Jews. Similar gaps between 
Jews and non-Jews were evident on every question dealing with the role of religion 
in the schools.4
The same paradigm held for views on the appropriateness of religious expres-
sion in public life. Asked if “organized religion should stay out of politics,” 56% of 
the general public and a whopping 88% of Jews agreed. Among the general public, 
an overwhelming 70% were “pleased when political leaders publicly affirm their 
belief in God.” Only 30% of the Jewish sample was pleased – a harbinger of the di-
spleasure many Jews would feel that summer when the Democratic vice-presidential 
candidate, Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, spoke openly about his Jewish faith. And 
while the general sample, by almost identical majorities, felt it “okay” for municipal 
authorities to put up manger scenes and Hanukkah candles on public property during 
the winter holiday season (80% for the former, 79% for the latter), just 43% of Jews 
approved of the mangers and 46% the candles. The extraordinarily paradoxical fact 
was that Christians were far more in favor of the public display of Jewish religious 
symbols than Jews themselves.5 
Jewish and non-Jewish culture-war differences were seen on abortion and se-
xuality as well.  On the former, the gap had widened considerably since 1981. On 
the abortion question, 88% of Jews and 58% of the general public said that “abortion 
should be generally available to those who want it.” And while 42% of Americans 
considered it appropriate for the Right to Life movement to use religion in its oppo-
sition to abortion, only 15% of Jews thought so. Forty-eight percent of all American 
opposed same sex relations as compared to 23% of Jews who did; 52% of Jews, but 
just 32% of Americans, favored homosexual marriage.6 
Not surprisingly, the Jewish preference for individual choice and distrust of 
religion in public life once again surfaced in response to questions about political 
views. While only 31% of the American public identified itself with the Democrats, 
3 S. M. Cohen, American Modernity and Jewish Identity, New York 1983, p. 140.
4 Idem, Attitudes of American Jews in Comparative Perspective, Philadelphia 2000, p. 19.
5 Ibidem, p. 23
6 Ibidem, pp. 26, 28.
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fully 59% of Jews did. In a way, this gap actually understates the Jewish preference 
for the Democrats. In a separate polling of a sample of Jewish communal leaders – 
people who spoke for and presumably represented American Jewry to the broader 
American public – 81% were Democrats.7
At December 2011 survey conducted by the Public Religion Research Insti-
tute suggests the same, if not a greater, Jewish–non-Jewish divide, even though the 
differently-worded questions rule out direct comparison with the 2000 study.  Fifty-
-three percent of all Americans believe that abortion should be legal in all or most ca-
ses, far less than the 93% of Jews who think so. The percentage of Jews favoring le-
galization of same-sex marriage outstrips the non-Jewish figure by 81% to 48% (51% 
of the Jews “strongly” favor it). In response to a question, not asked in 2000, about 
their opinion of various non-Jewish groups, Jews gave a “favorability rating” (on 
a 100-point scale) of 47 for Mormons, 41.4 for Muslims, and just 20.9 for the Chri-
stian Right, a group primarily associated with promoting religious values in Ameri-
can public life. That the generally pro-Israel Christian Right is viewed so much more 
unfavorably than Muslims in a post-9/11 world demonstrates that American Jewish 
opposition to Christian influence on the domestic scene would seem to dwarf its con-
cerns about the Middle East conflict.8
And again, Jews are overwhelmingly found in the Democratic political camp. 
In September 2012 – even as the Israeli prime minister berated the American admini-
stration for failing to set forth “red lines” defining at what point it will use force aga-
inst the Iranian nuclear project, and soon after the Democratic national convention 
had to embarrassedly insert a missing plank in its platform affirming that Jerusalem 
is Israel’s capital – Gallup reported that President Obama held a 70%-25% lead over 
Mitt Romney, his Republican challenger, among Jewish voters.9  
Judaism Liberalism, Religious or Secular
Why American Jews should be so much more averse to allowing religion a place 
in public life than Catholics or Protestants has generated a considerable amount of 
scholarship. 
Many Jewish liberals consider it axiomatic that the Jewish tradition motivates 
their attitudes. Political scientist Lawrence Fuchs, who first analyzed this mindset, 
argued that most Jews consider the Hebrew Bible’s prophetic teachings of humani-
tarianism and compassion – as in the much-cited command “Love Your Neighbor 
As Yourself” – the basis for an ethic stressing social justice and support for individu-
al self-fulfillment; Jewish respect for learning and intellect as promoting unfettered 
freedom of thought and expression; and Judaism’s alleged this-worldly, non-ascetic 
7 Ibidem, p. 29.
8 R. P. Jones, D. Cox, Chosen For What? Jewish Values in 2012, Washington DC 2012, pp. 39, 19.
9 www.jpost.com/USPresidentialrace/Article.aspx?id=285336.
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appreciation of physical pleasure as buttressing the case for noninterference with 
peoples’ sexual predilections.10 
Whether or not this is an accurate picture of the Jewish tradition, a good num-
ber of Jews have a deep need to believe it to be what Judaism demands. Beautifully 
exemplifying this need is Kenneth Wald’s story of a congregant who asked his rabbi 
about the Jewish position on abortion. “The rabbi tried hard to provide an answer 
that captured the subtlety and ambiguity of Jewish thinking on this perplexing topic,” 
finally concluding that abortion was “morally permissible under certain circumstan-
ces.” The congregant “breathed an audible sigh of relief, saying how happy he was to 
learn that Judaism supported his pro-choice position on abortion.”11 
But, as Charles Liebman has pointed out, “Jewish religious values are not 
unambiguously liberal; they are folk oriented rather than universalistic, ethnocentric 
rather than cosmopolitan, and at least one major strand in the Jewish tradition expres-
ses indifference, fear, and even hostility toward the non-Jew.”12 The neighbor to be 
loved as oneself was a fellow Jew; Jewish respect for intellectuality was, until modern 
times, geared toward knowledge of Jewish sacred texts, not academia; and sexuality, 
according to the classical Jewish codes, was to be channeled exclusively into hetero-
sexual marriage. Similarly, traditional Judaism’s respect for authority, reverence for 
tradition, and unwillingness to sacrifice group identity through assimilation into the 
wider society fit well with an outlook that favors the expression of religious points 
of view in the public debate, even though comparatively few American Jews in fact 
espouse this course. Forty years ago Liebman identified an important element of the 
minority that did, Orthodox Jews, noting that they, the Jews most strongly committed 
to the precepts of the faith, “are less liberal than non-Orthodox,”13 a situation that 
continues today and will be discussed below.   
To be sure, sophisticated American Jewish liberals are well aware that the 
sources of Judaism contain much that contradicts the liberal political and social ethos 
that predominates in the Jewish community today. They concede that by interpreting 
Judaism to fit contemporary sensibilities they are announcing, in the words of Le-
onard Fein, that “we, the living Jews of this generation, are the text.” Fein explains, 
“I take what I need from the tradition, and what I like, and what I can use, the parts 
that make substantive sense and the parts that have stylistic appeal.”14 But there is 
10 L. H. Fuchs, Sources for Jewish Internationalism and Liberalism, [in:] The Jews: Social 
Patterns of an American Group, ed. M. Sklare, Glencoe IL 1958, pp. 596–613. This is excerpted from 
Fuchs’s book, The Political Behavior of American Jews, Glencoe IL 1956.
11 K. D. Wald, The Probable Persistence of American Jewish Liberalism, [in:] Religion as 
a Public Good: Jews and other Americans on Religion in the Public Square, ed. A. Mittleman, Lan-
ham MD 2003, p. 65.
12 Ch. S. Liebman, The Ambivalent American Jew: Politics, Religion, and Family in American 
Jewish Life, Philadelphia 1973, p. 140. 
13 Ibidem, p. 143.
14 L. Fein, Where Are We? The Inner Life of America’s Jews, New York 1988, pp. 32, 41. The 
most recent treatment of the Biblical evidence (M. Walzer’s, In God’s Shadow: Politics in the Hebrew 
Bible, New Haven 2012), concludes that it presents no coherent political viewpoint.
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good reason to believe that the overwhelming Jewish preference for sharply limiting 
the role of faith-based values in the public square has less to do with religious beliefs 
than with their lack. American Jews may be disproportionately liberal because they 
are far less religious, both in terms of belief and of action, than Christians. 
The Pew Forum U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, conducted in 2008, com-
pared the various American religious denominations on a host of theological, beha-
vioral, social and cultural issues.15 It found that while 90% of Protestant Evangelicals, 
73% of Mainline Protestants, and 72 percent of Catholics were absolutely certain 
of the existence of God, only 41% of Jews were. American Buddhists, adherents of 
a non-theistic religion, were the only group scoring lower, at 39%. Ten percent of the 
Jews said they did not believe in God, a position that no more than 1% of the Catho-
lics or any group of Protestants took. Asked about the importance of religion in their 
life, just 31% of Jews thought it “very important,” an answer given by 79% of Evan-
gelicals, 52% of Mainliners, and 56% of Catholics. Sixteen percent of Jews said they 
attended religious services at least once a week, as compared to 58% of Evangelicals, 
34% of Mainline Protestants and 42% of Catholics. And the 26% of Jews claiming to 
pray daily was by far the lowest of any group, trailing even the Buddhists. 
The same anomalous position of Jews in the American religious spectrum 
shows up in the responses to Pew’s questions about religious beliefs. While 37% of 
Jews believed that Scripture was the word of God – either literally or in some other 
sense – 80% of Evangelicals, 62% of Catholics and 60% of Mainline Protestants 
thought so. Only 5% of the Jews viewed their own religion as the one true faith, tied 
with Buddhists and Hindus for last place. 
The low scores of Jews on measures of religion undoubtedly reflect the fact 
that unlike Christianity, Jewish identity is not just a matter of religion, but implies 
ethnic and cultural content as well as, or even instead of, religion. While a Catholic 
atheist, for example, may be a contradiction in terms, Jewish atheists exist in abun-
dant numbers. Also, low Jewish religiosity in such surveys may be partially due to 
the growing phenomenon of young adult and middle-age Jews who identify with 
Judaism but reserve the right to live out that identification in highly individual, even 
idiosyncratic terms. Their expression of Jewishness may not necessarily conform 
to the standard categories of religious belief and behavior that an earlier generation 
recognized, or that present-day social scientists would recognize, as Jewish.16 
The Historical Dimension
An alternative to the religious explanation of the Jewish proclivity toward the liberal/
secularist side of the culture wars is the history of the Jewish people. Centuries of li-
15 www.religions.pewforum.org/comparisons.
16 S. M. Cohen, A. M. Eisen, The Jew Within: Self, Family, and Community in America, 
Bloomington IN 2000.
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ving as an often persecuted minority under Christian governments, in which religion 
and state were intimately bound together (a similar situation confronted Jews living 
under Muslim rule) left the Jews of Europe with a collective aversion to religion 
exercising power and influence in the public square. The emergence of the modern 
Western nation-state, where religion’s public wings are clipped, ultimately brought 
with it Jewish emancipation, as previous restrictions on Jews’ religious, economic, 
occupational and residential freedom were gradually lifted. 
But these gains did not come without struggle. Almost invariably, the domi-
nant Christian religious establishment sought to use its remaining public influence to 
block Jewish equality, while the anticlerical elements in the various countries advo-
cated Jewish rights as part of their broader liberal, secularist agenda. Thus the French 
Revolution, which destroyed the Bourbon monarchy and the power of the established 
church allied with it, emancipated the Jews. A similar, if less dramatic and bloody, 
pattern was evident elsewhere in Europe, seemingly teaching Jews the lesson that 
they, the small minority, were best off when religion is kept out of public life.
This explains the unique place that the United States holds in Jewish history. 
From the nation’s beginnings, there was no established national religion, and Jews 
were on a plane of legal equality with Christians. As newly-elected President George 
Washington wrote to the Jewish congregation of Newport, Rhode Island, in 1790, 
this was not mere toleration, “as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people that 
another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights.” Rather, in the United 
States everyone alike enjoyed “liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship.”17 
While certainly welcome, this novel situation of no national religious establi-
shment did not ease Jews’ insecurity about their status in America. Christianity was 
still the religion of the vast majority, and popular culture was not free of denigration 
of Judaism and outright anti-Semitism. Jews, ever on the alert for signs of religious 
encroachment into public life, have viewed any attempt to inject religion – it would, 
of necessity, be the majority Christian religion – into governmental decision-making 
as a clear and present danger to Jewish interests and a violation of the Jewish Ame-
rican dream. 
Furthermore, Jews tended to support the rights of other minorities and their 
struggles for equality, on the grounds that depriving one group of rights threatened 
the rights of all. Most American Jews, then, have felt they were acting not only on the 
basis of Jewish values, but also in their own self-interest by supporting organizations 
and voting for political candidates committed to civil rights, civil liberties, broad 
free-speech protections, sexual freedom, and a strict interpretation of Church-State 
separation. It is no accident that a good number of the court cases that gave rise to 
legal precedents in these areas were litigated by Jewish organizations.18
17 www.gwpapers.virgina.edu/documents/hebrew/reply.html.
18 G. Ivers, To Build a Wall: American Jews and the Separation of Church and State, Char-
lottesville VA 1995; S. Svonkin, Jews Against Prejudice: American Jews and the Fight for Civil 
Liberties, New York 1997.
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Jews on the Defensive
The culture wars, strictly speaking, began with the emergence of a Christian Right, 
a traditionalist backlash against the gradual removal of religious values from public 
life that had been happening, with the blessings and often the political advocacy of 
Jews, since the 1960s. 
This came as an unwelcome shock to the mainstream Jewish community, who-
se organizations naturally mobilized to protect what they saw as under threat, which 
was, in the words of the American Jewish Congress, “support for the separation of 
Church and State and the protection of the public school classroom; support for the 
Equal Rights Amendment [barring discrimination against women] and the right of 
women to choose to have an abortion; support for human rights and opposition to 
all oppressive governments; support for the right to dissent and opposition to cen-
sorship; support for compassionate social welfare legislation… the classic agenda of 
democracy.”19 The National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, whose 
annual Joint Program Plan reflected the consensus of organized American Jewry, put 
front and center the need to oppose restoration of prayer and other religious practices 
in the public schools, enactment of tuition tax credits for private schools, and all other 
measures that threatened the Jewish community’s insistence on keeping religion 
a private matter.20  
Jews felt an added degree of alarm over the new political role of Evangelical 
Protestants. Jewish groups were long used to the Catholic Church’s opposition to 
birth control, abortion, and homosexuality, and its attempts to secure government 
support for parochial schools. But the newly aroused Evangelicals, whose militancy 
in opposition to the naked public square appeared to far outstrip the Catholics, was 
something else entirely. 
The mainstream Jewish organizations, all liberal in orientation, had histori-
cally found natural allies in the Mainline Protestant denominations, as represented 
by the National Council of Churches, in their opposition to assaults on separation of 
Church and State that came mainly from the Catholics. But Jews had little awareness 
that there was another, quite substantial variant of Protestant Christianity that looked 
askance at strict separation, and this took them by surprise. Adding to the alarm was 
the substantial size of the Evangelical population and its potential political clout. Es-
timates ranged from 30 million adults, total church membership in the major Evange-
lical denominations, to as high as 130 million, if people formally outside these bodies 
but sympathetic to the Evangelical message were included. The Gallup organization, 
in 1981, estimated that 35 million potential voters could be classified as Evangelicals, 
roughly 20% of the electorate.21
19 Where We Stand: The Evangelical Right, “Congress Monthly”, January 1982, p. 8.
20 National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, Joint Program Plan 1982–83, pp. 
50–54; 1983–84, pp. 59–64; 1984–85, pp. 31–35; 1985–86, pp. 7–15; 1986–87, pp. 38–40; 1987–88, 
pp. 39–42. This body changed its name to the Jewish Council for Public Affairs (JCPA) in 1999.
21 K. D. Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States, New York 1987, pp. 199–200.
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One could hardly blame the Jews for not expecting this Evangelical surge. For 
one thing, Evangelicals had more or less quit the national political arena in the 1930s, 
after the embarrassment of their involvement with the Ku Klux Klan and opposition to 
the teaching of Darwinian evolution, and the failure of prohibition. Their return to the 
debate over religion in public life surprised most observers.22 Also, since Jews tended 
to live in cities and on the East Coast, and the Evangelical center of gravity was in 
rural and small-town America, the two groups rarely interacted.23 A corollary of this 
geographic and social distancing was the growth of stereotypes: just as Evangelicals 
might assume that all Jews were conniving bankers and businessmen (and Christ-kil-
lers to boot), so too did Jews tend to think that Evangelicals were uneducated country 
bumpkins, hardly worthy of serious engagement on issues of public policy.24 
Another reason for Jews to place themselves on the other side of the barri-
cade from Evangelicals in the culture wars was fear of the latters’ conversionary 
intentions and denigration of Judaism. The involvement of Evangelical leaders in 
the “Key 73” project, designed “to call the continent to Christ,” was still fresh in 
the memory of Jews when the culture wars erupted. In 1980 there was the remark 
of Rev. Bailey Smith, that “God Almighty does not hear the prayer of a Jew.” Nine 
years later, 15 American Evangelical theologians issued a statement that “failure to 
preach the gospel to the Jewish people would be a form of anti-Semitism, depriving 
this particular community of its right to hear the gospel.” In 1996, the Southern Bap-
tist Convention, by a large majority, resolved to “direct our energies and resources 
toward the proclamation of the gospel to the Jews,” and six years later its coordinator 
for Jewish ministries said that the Catholic “exemption” of Jews from proselytization 
was “withholding the hope of Israel.”  Even though many of these flare-ups, and 
others like them, were followed by apologies and acts of reconciliation, the impres-
sion that Evangelicals were intent on converting them was widespread in the Jewish 
community.25 
Despite their fear of Evangelical designs on the separation of Church and Sta-
te, and whatever their suspicions about designs of conversion, Jews had to tread 
carefully in fighting the culture wars. Evangelical churches, entering an era of expan-
sion, were enhancing their influence in American life at the expense of the mainline 
denominations. And the fact was that the Evangelicals, though at loggerheads with 
22 Ibidem, pp. 182–186.
23 L. Grossman, Jews – Middle Atlantic and Beyond, [in:] Religion and Public Life in the Mid-
dle Atlantic Region: The Fount of Diversity, ed. R. Balmer, M. Silk, Lanham MD 2006, pp. 95–98; 
J. Hudnut-Beumler, Protestants in the Middle Atlantic Region, ibidem, p. 48.
24 Consider G. Mamo’s protest: “We’re not all Elmer Gantry holy rollers. We’re not all South-
erners. We don’t all drive pickup trucks. We’re not all poorly educated rednecks. And most of us 
have never owned a white suit.” G. Mamo, Luckier than Moses: the Future of Jewish-Evangelical 
Relations, [in:] Uneasy Allies: Evangelicals and Jewish Relations, eds. B. Johnson, Nancy Isserman, 
A. Mittleman, Lanham MD 2007, p. 77.
25 L. Grossman, The Organized Jewish Community and Evangelical America, [in:] Uneasy 
Allies…, pp. 54–60.
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the Jewish community in the culture wars, were at the same time its greatest allies in 
support of the State of Israel. After the Six-Day War of 1967, when American Jews 
complained of “the relative silence of the Christian world in the face of the threat of 
the imminent destruction of the two-and-a-half million Jews in Israel,” they noticed 
that Evangelicals were an exception.26 Ever since, Evangelicals have remained the 
American Christian group most supportive of Israel, and have contributed many mil-
lions of dollars to it.27 
Jews are not quite sure why Evangelicals are so pro-Israel – is it a sincere con-
cern for the welfare of a democratic state that shares basic American values, a literal 
reading of Biblical passages that grant the Promised Land to God’s original chosen 
people, a Christian eschatological scheme for setting off the war of Gog and Magog 
and hastening the Second Coming, a conversionary ploy? Whatever the rationale, 
Jews and Evangelicals were so at odds on domestic issues that the Jewish community 
could reach no consensus on whether it was wise to ally with these pro-Israel Chri-
stians on a common agenda in support of the Jewish state. 
The government of Israel itself, removed as it is from the American culture 
wars, has had no qualms about welcoming Evangelical backing and even encoura-
ging its expression in the American political arena. This was evident as early as 1980, 
when Evangelical support played a major role in the election of Ronald Reagan as 
president. Israel’s prime minister at the time, Menachem Begin, conferred the co-
veted Jabotinsky Centennial Medal on the strongly pro-Israel Jerry Falwell, head 
of the powerful Moral Majority organization, for “distinguished service to the State 
of Israel and the Jewish people.”28 The current prime minister, Benjamin Netany-
ahu, maneuvering against Barack Obama—a president who both opposes the agenda 
of the Religious Right and is cooler toward Israel than Reagan—has gone over the 
president’s head and appealed directly to Congress and the American people, with 
special attention to the large Evangelical community.29 
Today, the prevalent mood within the organized American Jewish community 
is to encourage the continuing Evangelical commitment to Israel’s security while 
downplaying areas of continuing disagreement.30      
Countervailing Voices: Neoconservatism
While American Jews have arrayed themselves overwhelmingly on one side of the 
culture wars, in opposition to a public role for religious values, a minority dissents 
from this consensus.
26 National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, Joint Program Plan 1967–68, p. 7.
27 G. R. McDermott, Evangelicals and Israel, [in:] Uneasy Allies…, pp. 127–154.
28 L. Grossman, The Organized Jewish Community and Evangelical America…, p. 55. 
29 Idem, Jewish Communal Affairs, [in:] American Jewish Year Book 2012, eds. A. Dashefsky, 
I. Sheskin, Westport CT 2012, pp. 115–116.
30 C. Schrag, American Jews and Evangelical Christians: Anatomy of a Changing Relation-
ship, [in:] Uneasy Allies…, pp. 167–177.
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Small in numbers but influential in American intellectual life, Jewish neocon-
servatives have argued not only that a pervasively secular public square weakens 
America, but that it could also endanger Jewish group survival. Neoconservatism 
began in the mid-1960s, when erstwhile liberals began questioning the effectiveness 
of large-scale government programs to aid the poor. By the end of that decade, as 
urban racial unrest and protests against the Vietnam War spilled over into campus 
disruptions, anti-American rhetoric and acts of violence, they found themselves on 
the other side of the barricade, strongly defending traditional values and American 
patriotism. The American Left’s coolness toward the State of Israel in the aftermath 
of the Six-Day War of 1967 also provoked neoconservative ire. The subsequent rise 
of the counterculture, with its attack on the traditional family, approval of drug use, 
and frequent demonization of established American institutions, reinforced the neo-
conservative determination to fight back.31 
Many of the leading neoconservatives – Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Norman 
Podhoretz, Midge Decter, Allan Bloom, Martin Peretz – were Jewish. Furthermore, 
under the editorial direction of Podhoretz, Commentary, the editorially independent 
monthly sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, became neoconservatism’s 
leading journalistic voice.32 
Irving Kristol, the acknowledged godfather of the movement, most clearly 
stated its diagnosis of American Jewish life. “Dedication to secular humanism,” he 
wrote, “is so congenial to American Jews because it has assured them of an unparal-
leled degree of comfort and security.” It provided “individual Jews a civic equality 
and equality of opportunity undreamed of by previous Jewish generations.” But low 
birth rates encouraged by adoption of an upper-middle-class lifestyle and rising rates 
of intermarriage produced by the breakdown of older religious boundaries threatened 
the survival of the Jewish community. Kristol called on American Jews to reconsider 
their universalism, conquer their “suspicion and fear of Christianity,” support a lar-
ger role for religion in public life, and “reestablish a Jewish core, a religious core, as 
a key to its identity.”33  Kristol’s argument was fleshed out by Elliott Abrams, a youn-
ger neoconservative who served as assistant secretary of state in the Reagan admini-
stration. In the increasingly religious America that he saw emerging, Abrams urged 
Jews to recognize that Jewish survival depended on their seeing themselves as part of 
a religion, not just as members of an ethnic or cultural grouping, even if they lacked 
personal religious faith. Such a change of focus would entail a new willingness to 
cooperate with the Christian Right.34
31 M. Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of 
Public Policy, New York 2005, pp. 116–204.
32 B. Balint, Running Commentary: The Contentious Magazine that Transformed the Jewish 
Left into the Neoconservative Right, New York 2010, pp. 97–177.
33 I. Kristol, The Future of American Jewry, “Commentary”, August 1991, pp. 21–26; idem, 
Why Religion Is Good for the Jews, “Commentary”, August 1994, pp. 19–21.
34 E. Abrams, Faith Or Fear: How Jews Can Survive in a Christian America, New York 1997.
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At its height, neoconservatism powerfully influenced the Republican Party, 
its staunch anti-communism providing the intellectual ballast for policies credited 
with helping topple the soviet system. But the disastrous invasion of Iraq during the 
George W. Bush administration, widely attributed to neoconservative influence, the 
economic collapse of 2008, and the subsequent recapture of the presidency by the 
Democrats weakened neoconservatism on the American scene and hurt its credibility 
– never great to begin with – in the predominantly liberal Jewish community.
Countervailing Voices: The Orthodox
Potential new recruits to the side in the culture wars favoring increased public reco-
gnition of religion could be found in Jewish Orthodoxy, a sector of the community 
that was rising steadily in power and self-confidence.
Constituting, according to the most recent national surveys, no more than 10% 
of affiliated American Jews, the Orthodox were the most tradition-bound and least 
secularized element of the community, and hence most in tune with the priorities of 
the Catholic traditionalists and Protestant Evangelicals on the appropriate place of 
religion in society, the sanctity of life, and the priority of religion-based group valu-
es over individual autonomy. For years, this Orthodox minority studiously avoided 
expressing its voice in public debate. To an extent, this reticence reflected the same 
fear that motivated the Jewish mainstream: that more religion in public life meant, 
in the American context, more Christianity, and that was not good for Jews. But the-
re was another inhibiting factor peculiar to the Orthodox. As the weakest and least 
Americanized Jews, the Orthodox were reluctant to assert themselves. They tended 
either to defer to the Jewish mainstream, or to seek cultural isolation and “take care 
of themselves.”35   
This began to change, at least for some sectors of Orthodoxy, in the 1960s. 
The first Orthodox defections from adherence to the naked public square came when 
the Church-State barrier came up against the financial needs of Jewish schools. First, 
Agudath Israel of America, an Orthodox body heavily committed to the creation 
and maintenance of Jewish day schools, began cooperating with Catholic groups in 
seeking federal funding for non-public schools. Then the Union of Orthodox Jewish 
Congregations of America (sometimes called the Orthodox Union, or OU), the lar-
gest Orthodox synagogue body, defied the Jewish communal consensus by suppor-
ting the “child-benefit” provision of the Elementary and Secondary School Act of 
1965, which indirectly provided government aid for private and religious education. 
Ever since, Orthodox groups have shown little reluctance in seeking ways to secure 
public help for their educational institutions.36 
35 S. C. Heilman, Haredim and the Public Square, [in:] Jewish Polity and American Civil 
Society: Communal Agencies and Religious Movements in the American Public Square, eds. A. Mit-
tleman, J. D. Sarna, R. Licht, Lanham MD 2002, p. 333.
36 L. Grossman, Mainstream Orthodoxy and the American Public Square…, pp. 293–298.
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The OU also began speaking out against what it saw as threats to morality in 
the public sphere. In the 1960s it denounced what it viewed as declining standards 
of decency in the media, the ostensible growth of “permissiveness,” especially on 
the college campus, and the Equal Rights Amendment. When the abortion debate 
heated up, the OU declared that “an unborn fetus has the right to life,” and opposed 
government payments for abortion. And when gay rights entered the public arena in 
the 1970s, the Orthodox group characterized homosexuality as a “perversion” that no 
Jewish agency should condone. In 1974, the OU noted the sea change that had occur-
red in its approach to public policy: “Differences of opinion on public issues between 
the Orthodox community and others are no longer limited to Church-State affairs… 
Torah thinking, combined with greater communal and organizational strength, has 
moved the Orthodox Union to adopt different positions on some social issues.”37
The Orthodox community today is far friendlier to the public recognition of 
faith-based values than mainstream Jewish organizations, but constraining the full 
political expression of this preference is Orthodoxy’s heavy reliance on government 
social programs. A disproportionate share of American Jews living in poverty is Or-
thodox, a problem that is especially severe among the most insular elements, many 
of whom do not receive sufficient secular education to pursue careers that could 
afford them a living. As the Democratic Party generally supports these programs but 
frowns on religion in the public square, many Orthodox Jews find themselves in the 
uncomfortable position of voting for the party they rely on for material survival even 
though it stands counter to their culture-war preference for faith-based morality in 
public life.
A special election for Congress in 2011, however, suggested that more Or-
thodox Jews might be considering voting their values over their pocketbooks. The 
congressional district involved, encompassing portions of the New York City boro-
ughs of Brooklyn and Queens, was overwhelmingly Democratic, had a large Jewish 
population, and its previous representative was a liberal Democratic Jew. To fill this 
ostensibly “safe” Democratic seat, the party chose David Weprin, another liberal 
Democrat and an Orthodox Jew. The campaign of his Republican opponent, Bob 
Turner, went after the votes of Jewish Democrats by criticizing Democratic President 
Obama’s alleged unfriendliness to Israel. 
It also specifically targeted the Orthodox vote with ads, signed by prominent 
Orthodox rabbis, ripping into Weprin for his enthusiastic support, while serving in 
the State Assembly, for gay marriage. Even though Orthodox residents of the di-
strict risked losing governmentally-funded social programs by electing a Republican, 
enough of them did vote for Turner to give him victory by a comfortable 6-point 
margin.38 It remains to be seen whether or not such values-based political behavior 
becomes more common among Orthodox Jews. 
37 Ibidem, pp. 301–304.
38 T. Kaplan, G.O.P. Gains House Seat Vacated by Weiner, “New York Times”, September 13, 
2011, p. 1.
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What is undeniable is that the Orthodox are becoming more numerous, and 
hence potentially more influential in shaping the community’s priorities. A survey of 
the Jews in the New York City area, conducted in 2011, indicated that the percentage of 
Reform, Conservative and Reconstructionist Jews – the core constituency for Jewish 
liberalism – had declined drastically over the previous decade, from 48% to 39%. 
In contrast, the Orthodox share rose from 27% to 32%, constituting nearly 
half a million people. And the disparity appeared likely to widen over time, since 
an astounding 64% of Jewish children were being raised Orthodox, “about twice as 
many Jewish children who live in conservative, Reform, and Reconstructionist ho-
useholds combined.”39 The reasons for the Orthodox renaissance were clear: unlike 
many other Jews, the Orthodox had an intermarriage rate of virtually zero and com-
paratively high fertility. They also had near-universal intensive Jewish education and 
socialization, factors that naturally inculcated the traditional values that liberal Jews 
wanted kept out of the public square.
Since New York City Jews constituted about a quarter of American Jewry, 
this demographic trend could portend a major national shift in Jewish positioning in 
the culture wars. Orthodox Jews, largely antagonistic to the secular bent of the Je-
wish mainstream organizations, had the potential, over time, to become a new Jewish 
mainstream, and align with Christian traditionalists in the battle over the public role 
of religious values. Of course there is no reason to assume that present trends will 
continue. In this case there is no way to know if the Orthodox, and especially their 
children, will be able, over time, to withstand the cultural forces that so powerfully 
transmit the messages of individualism, secularism and universalism.  
Then again, there is no guarantee that Evangelical support for civic recogni-
tion of religious values will retain its intensity either. Indeed, there are signs of its 
possible erosion among some younger Evangelicals.40 It may soon become anachro-
nistic to speak of the culture wars as we have known them over the past generation. 
What configuration of opinions replaces it about the relationship of religious faith to 
public life is anyone’s guess.
Żydzi amerykańscy wobec wojny kulturowej
Autor podejmuje problem stanowiska amerykańskich Żydów w konflikcie kulturowym. Środo-
wiska żydowskie w Stanach Zjednoczonych, traktujące Amerykę jako historyczną szansę stworzenia li-
beralnego ustroju równych praw – w historii Europy tradycyjnie im odmawianych – zostały postawione 
wobec dylematu samookreślenia się wobec ewolucji liberalnej. W efekcie nastąpił ich podział z powodu 
zauważenia obecności w ewolucji liberalizmu pewnych zjawisk antywolnościowych i antyamerykań-
skich. Artykuł jest podsumowaniem dyskusji na ten temat.
39 S. M. Cohen, J. B. Ukeles, R. Miller, Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011, Compre-
hensive Report, New York 2012, pp. 122–123.
40 J. Farrell, The Young and the Restless: The Liberalization of Young Evangelicals, “Journal 
for the Scientific Study of Religion”, September 2011, pp. 517–532, and the website www.evangeli-
caliberal.wordpress.com.
